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In order to claim that one has experimentally tested whether a noncontextual ontological model
could underlie certain measurement statistics in quantum theory, it is necessary to have a notion of
noncontextuality that applies to unsharp measurements, i.e., those that can only be represented by
positive operator-valued measures rather than projection-valued measures. This is because any re-
alistic measurement necessarily has some nonvanishing amount of noise and therefore never achieves
the ideal of sharpness. Assuming a generalized notion of noncontextuality that applies to arbitrary
experimental procedures, it is shown that the outcome of a measurement depends deterministi-
cally on the ontic state of the system being measured if and only if the measurement is sharp.
Hence for every unsharp measurement, its outcome necessarily has an indeterministic dependence
on the ontic state. We defend this proposal against alternatives. In particular, we demonstrate why
considerations parallel to Fine’s theorem do not challenge this conclusion.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem concerns the pos-
sibility of explaining the predictions of quantum theory
in terms of a noncontextual ontological model [1, 2]. In
recent years, there has been some effort devoted to mak-
ing the notion of a noncontextual ontological model more
operational [4–7]. The goal of such efforts is to be able
to decide, for any given operational theory (possibly dis-
tinct from quantum theory), whether it admits of such a
model or not. Achieving this goal would allow one to as-
sess the possibility of a noncontextual ontological model
based solely on experimental data (regardless of whether
or not this data is consistent with quantum theory): just
as the observation of Bell inequality violations [8] rule
out a locally causal model of nature1, irrespective of the
truth of quantum theory, so too would violations of oper-
ational noncontextuality inequalities rule out a noncon-
textual ontological model of nature.
This article does not explicitly address the question of
how to derive such inequalities. Rather, it presents some
preparatory work towards this goal. We presume the
correctness of operational quantum theory, but we con-
sider the predictions of quantum theory for experiments
that do not satisfy the idealizations that are typically as-
sumed in discussions of noncontextuality. In particular,
we relax the assumption that all the measurements in the
experiment are projective. This assumption is an ideal-
ization because any realistic measurement procedure on
a physical system is subject to some unavoidable noise,
and consequently cannot be represented by a set of pro-
jectors on the Hilbert space of the system. Rather, it
must be represented by a positive operator valued mea-
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1More precisely, they rule out models that satisfy Bell’s notion of
local causality and certain other assumptions, such as the freedom
of settings.
sure (POVM), that is, a set of positive operators (called
effects) that sum to the identity operator.
Recall that any measurement procedure can be repre-
sented by a POVM. In the special case where all of the
effects in the POVM are projectors, we call the POVM
a projector-valued measure and we call the measurement
projective or sharp. If the POVM that represents a mea-
surement is not a projector-valued measure, we call the
measurement unsharp. The fact that no realistic mea-
surement procedure is strictly free of noise implies that
sharpness is an ideal that is never actually realized in
any experiment. Consequently, the question of how to
represent unsharp measurements in a noncontextual on-
tological model is critical if one wishes to compare the
predictions of such a model to the predictions of quan-
tum theory that actually arise in realistic experiments.
One proposal which has been made is that every un-
sharp measurement should be represented by a set of
outcome-deterministic response functions. What this
means is that the ontological model specifies hidden vari-
ables which fix the outcome of each unsharp measure-
ment (in a context-independent manner). This assump-
tion, of outcome determinism for all unsharp measure-
ments, will be abbreviated as ODUM. It is explicit, for
instance, in Ref. [9] (here v(E) denotes the value assigned
by the hidden variables to an effect E appearing in a
POVM):
An interpretation of valuations as truth value
assignments would require the numbers v(E)
to be either 1 or 0, indicating the occurrence
or nonoccurrence of an outcome associated
with E. Valuations with this property are
referred to as dispersion-free.
The assumption of ODUM is also made in Ref. [10] (here,
the discussion is of a particular set of unsharp quantum
measurements):
Each [POVM in the set] contains eight
positive-semidefinite operators whose sum is
2the identity. Therefore, a noncontextual
hidden-variable theory must assign the an-
swer yes to one and only one of these eight
operators.
In fact, this assumption has been made in almost every
article that has considered noncontextuality for unsharp
measurements [9–15].
In this article, we will argue against ODUM.
Adopting the operational notion of a noncontextual
ontological model that the author proposed in Ref. [7],
we will argue that unsharp measurements in quantum
theory must be represented by outcome-indeterministic
response functions. The representation is still noncon-
textual insofar as the probability that one assigns to an
outcome does not depend on the context. The repre-
sentation also remains highly constrained because sharp
measurements will still need to be represented by a set
of outcome-deterministic response functions (See Thm. 3
below).2 This fact about the representation of sharp
measurements is relevant for realistic experiments, even
though all the measurements in such experiments are
unsharp. This is because quantum theory dictates that
a given unsharp measurement can be related in various
ways to a set of idealized sharp measurements. For in-
stance, it may be the case that the unsharp measurement
realized in an experiment is a convex mixture of a set of
idealized sharp measurements. As another example, it
is always possible to express an unsharp measurement
on some system as the reduction of an idealized sharp
measurement on a larger system. Such relations typi-
cally imply that the response function for a given unsharp
measurement is expressible in terms of the response func-
tions for the idealized sharp measurements; the fact that
the latter are required to be outcome-deterministic then
imposes nontrivial constraints on the former.
We begin by highlighting an intuitive (but mistaken)
argument in favour of ODUM. It is well-known in foun-
dational circles that if one can find a local indetermin-
istic ontological model for some set of correlations in a
Bell-type experiment, then one can also find a local de-
terministic ontological model for the same set. This was
first noted by Fine [16]. As such, if one can rule out local
2The fact that all noncontextual ontological models must repre-
sent sharp measurements outcome-deterministically implies in par-
ticular that the ψ-complete ontological model of quantum theory
fails to be a noncontextual model. The ψ-complete ontological
model of quantum theory is the one wherein the ontic states are
the pure quantum states (i.e. no hidden variables) and the re-
sponse function associated to an effect is simply the conditional
probability defined by the Born rule [19]. This model is sometimes
called the “orthodox” interpretation of quantum theory. Given
the use of the Born rule, the response functions in this model are
outcome-indeterministic even for sharp measurements and there-
fore our result implies that the model cannot be noncontextual.
This inference is correct because the ψ-complete ontological model
fails to be preparation noncontextual, as explained in Sec. VIII.B
of Ref. [7].
deterministic models for some set of correlations, then
one has also ruled out local indeterministic models. In
other words, although one might have imagined that the
class of correlations that can be explained by local inde-
terministic models is strictly larger than the class that
can be explained by local deterministic models, it turns
out that the classes of correlations that can be explained
by the two sorts of models are precisely the same.
In discussions of noncontextuality, the role of deter-
minism is less clear. Kochen and Specker’s notion of a
noncontextual model explicitly incorporated the assump-
tion that the outcomes of a measurement should be fixed
deterministically by the hidden variables. One of the
selling points of the operational definition of noncontex-
tuality proposed in Ref. [7] is that it explicitly disentan-
gles the notion of measurement noncontextuality from
the assumption of outcome determinism. Furthermore,
by using a notion of noncontextuality for preparations,
one can justify the assumption of outcome determinism
for sharp measurements [7]. As such, the contradiction
that is derived in the Kochen-Specker theorem forces us
to reject some assumption of noncontextuality. However,
there is nothing that warrants assuming outcome deter-
minism for unsharp measurements. As such, any no-go
theorem that assumes ODUM and derives a contradiction
does not deserve to be called a proof of the impossibility
of a noncontextual ontological model because in the face
of a contradiction, one can always assume that the faulty
assumption was that of outcome determinism rather than
that of noncontextuality.
Nonetheless, one might wonder whether a version of
Fine’s theorem applies to noncontextual models just as
it does to locally-causal models. That is, one might won-
der whether arguments analogous to those of Fine could
establish that one can rule out noncontextual ontologi-
cal models that are outcome-indeterministic for unsharp
measurements if and only if one can also rule out those
that are outcome-deterministic for these measurements.
If this were so, then there would be no loss of generality
in assuming ODUM, and consequently no good reason
not to do so.
In fact, in Ref. [17], this is the reason given for not
considering outcome-indeterministic models:
[We] do not discuss stochastic hidden variable
theories explicitly. This does not limit the
generality of the results derived because the
existence of a stochastic local or noncontex-
tual hidden variable model for a given physi-
cal system implies that also an underlying de-
terministic local or noncontextual model can
be constructed which reproduces the proba-
bilities of the stochastic model. Therefore,
e.g., ruling out all possible noncontextual de-
terministic hidden variable models implies
ruling out all possible noncontextual stochas-
tic models as well.
In this article, we will explain why this intuition is
3mistaken, that is, why Fine’s theorem does not extend to
noncontextual models in the manner that would be re-
quired to justify ODUM. The explanation, in essence, is
the following: while it is true that one can always model
a measurement that depends indeterministically on the
ontic state of the system by one that depends determin-
istically on the ontic state of a larger system (including,
for instance, hidden variables in the apparatus), never-
theless, under such a change of representation one finds
that measurement events that differ only by a choice of
context are mapped to measurement events that differ
in their operational statistics and consequently one loses
the warrant to apply the assumption of noncontextuality.
We also provide a number of additional arguments
against outcome-deterministic representations of unsharp
measurements in noncontextual models and against vari-
ants of these arguments that seek to limit the sorts of
unsharp measurements to which the assumption of non-
contextuality can be applied.
In addition, we discuss some of the consequences of
our result that measurements are represented outcome-
deterministically if and only if they are sharp. For in-
stance, the assumption of measurement noncontextual-
ity implies the existence of a valuation that assigns to
each effect a probability (independently of the POVM in
which that effect appears), and our results imply that the
value assigned to an effect must be one of its eigenval-
ues. This observation allows us to provide significantly
simplified versions of two proofs of the impossibility of a
noncontextual ontological model of operational quantum
theory which were first presented in Ref. [7] and which
make explicit use of the assumption of noncontextuality
for unsharp measurements.
The article is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we
provide definitions of the relevant background concepts
for this article: operational theories, ontological models,
noncontextuality, and outcome determinism. Sec. III de-
scribes the intuition in favour of ODUM (along the lines
of Fine’s theorem) and why it is mistaken. Additional
supporting material for this section is provided in the ap-
pendices. Sec. IV presents the proof that within a non-
contextual ontological model, a measurement is repre-
sented outcome-deterministically if and only if it is sharp.
We also discuss which predictions of operational quantum
theory are required for the proof and the significance of
the result. In Sec. V, we discuss how post-processing
of a measurement is represented in an ontological model
and draw out the consequences for noncontextual repre-
sentations of sharp and unsharp measurements. In par-
ticular, we formulate the constraints on noncontextual
representations of measurements in terms of probability-
assignments to effects. Sec. VI presents a few more argu-
ments against ODUM, in the form of a dialogue between
the author and an imaginary proponent of ODUM. Fi-
nally, in Sec. VII, we use the constraints on noncontextual
representations of measurements in terms of probability
assignments to effects (introduced in Sec. V) to provide
simple proofs of no-go theorems for noncontextuality that
make explicit use of unsharp measurements.
II. GENERALIZED NONCONTEXTUALITY
AND OUTCOME-DETERMINISM
An operational theory is a triple (P ,M, p) where P is
a set of preparation procedures, an element of which is
denoted by P , where M is a set of measurement pro-
cedures, an element of which is denoted by M and for
which the corresponding set of outcomes (assumed here
to be discrete) is denoted by KM , and where p : P×M→
[0, 1]KM :: (P,M) 7→ p(k|M,P ) is a nonnegative function
satisfying
∑
k∈KM
p(k|M,P ) = 1 for all M ∈ M and all
P ∈ P . p(k|M,P ) specifies the probability of obtaining
outcome k in a measurement of M following a prepara-
tion P. In brief, an operational theory specifies the pos-
sible measurements and preparations and the statistics
one obtains over the outcomes of any measurement given
any preparation.
An ontological model for an operational theory
(P ,M, p) is a triple (Λ, µ, ξ) where Λ is a discrete set3,
where µ : P × Λ → [0, 1] :: (P, λ) 7→ µ(λ|P ) is a non-
negative function satisfying
∑
λ∈Λ µ (λ|P ) = 1 for all
P ∈ P , where ξ : M × Λ → [0, 1]KM :: (M,λ) 7→
ξ(k|λ,M) is a nonnegative vector function satisfying∑
k∈KM
ξ (k|λ,M) = 1 for all λ ∈ Λ and for all M ∈ M,
and where
∑
λ∈Λ
µ (λ|P ) ξ (k|λ,M) = p (k|M,P ) , (1)
for all M ∈ M and P ∈ P . The interpretation of these
mathematical expressions is as follows: λ ∈ Λ denotes
an ontic state, that is, a complete specification of all the
physical properties of the system (including a valuation
of any hidden variables), and Λ is the space of possible
ontic states for the system; µ (λ|P ) is the probability that
the system is in ontic state λ given that it was prepared
according to preparation P , and ξ (k|λ,M) is the proba-
bility that measurement M yields outcome k given that
the system which was fed into the measurement device
had ontic state λ. The set {ξ (k|λ,M) : k ∈ KM}, consid-
ered as functions over Λ, will be called the set of response
functions associated with M . Equation (1) asserts that
the overall probability of outcome k given preparation P
and measurement M specified by the operational theory
is recovered by the ontological model.
According to the proposal of Ref. [7], noncontextuality
is a property of an ontological model of an operational
theory. A distinction is also made between two sorts of
noncontextuality, one which pertains to the representa-
3More generally, an ontological model may be defined such that
Λ is a continuous space, in which case µ : P ×Λ→ R+ is a proba-
bility density and sums over λ are replaced by integrals.
4tion of preparations and the other of which pertains to
the representation of measurements.
Definition 1 (noncontextuality) An ontological
model (Λ, µ, ξ) of an operational theory (P ,M, p) is
said to be preparation noncontextual if the following
implication holds: for any pair of preparation procedures
P, P ′ ∈ P,
if p(k|P,M) = p(k|P ′,M) ∀M ∈ M
then µ(λ|P ) = µ(λ|P ′) ∀λ ∈ Λ. (2)
In other words, preparation noncontextuality is the as-
sumption that if two preparations yield the same statistics
for all possible measurements then they are represented
equivalently in the ontological model.
Similarly, an ontological model of an operational the-
ory is said to be measurement noncontextual if the fol-
lowing implication holds: for any pair of measurement
procedures M,M ′ ∈M,
if p(k|P,M) = p(k|P,M ′) ∀P ∈ P
then ξ (k|λ,M) = ξ (k|λ,M ′) ∀λ ∈ Λ. (3)
In other words, measurement noncontextuality is the as-
sumption that if two measurements have the same statis-
tics for all possible preparations then they are represented
equivalently in the ontological model.
It is the notion of measurement noncontextuality that
will be of particular interest to us here.
In order to understand this notion better, it is use-
ful to adopt the following terminological conventions.
In an operational theory, the operational statistics of a
measurement M are the probability distributions over
outcomes for all possible preparation procedures, that
is, the set {(p (k|M,P ) : k ∈ KM ) : P ∈ P} . If two mea-
surements M and M ′ have the same operational statis-
tics, then they are said to be statistically indistinguish-
able relative to all preparations. In an ontological model
of an operational theory, the ontological statistics of a
measurement M are the probability distributions over
outcomes for all possible ontic states λ, that is, the set
{(ξ (k|M,λ) : k ∈ KM ) : λ ∈ Λ} . If two measurementsM
and M ′ have the same ontological statistics, then they
are said to be statistically indistinguishable relative to
all ontic states. Given this terminology, the assumption
of measurement noncontextuality can be summarized as
simply:
An ontological model of an operational the-
ory is measurement noncontextual if mea-
surements that are statistically indistinguish-
able relative to all preparations are statis-
tically indistinguishable relative to all ontic
states.
We now provide a definition of the notion of outcome
determinism, the central topic of this article. We here
make use of the notion of a measurement event, which
refers to the pair consisting of a measurement and an
outcome of that measurement.
Definition 2 (outcome determinism) A response
function ξ (k|λ,M) representing a measurement event
(outcome k of measurement M) is said to be outcome-
deterministic if
ξ (k|λ,M) ∈ {0, 1} ∀λ ∈ Λ, (4)
that is, if the probability of obtaining the outcome in ques-
tion, conditioned on the ontic state λ, is either 0 or 1.
Otherwise, it is said to be outcome-indeterministic. A
measurement M associated to a set of response functions
{ξ (k|λ,M) : k ∈ KM} is said to be represented outcome-
deterministically if every response function in the set is
outcome-deterministic. Otherwise, it is said to be repre-
sented outcome-indeterministically.
We will also say that we have outcome determinism
(respectively outcome indeterminism) for some class of
measurements if every measurement in the class is repre-
sented outcome-deterministically (respectively outcome-
indeterministically). 4
We can therefore enumerate the three possibilities for
how ontological models of quantum theory might treat
sharp measurements:
(a) Outcome determinism for all sharp measurements
(b) Outcome indeterminism for all sharp measurements
(c) Outcome determinism for some sharp measure-
ments and outcome indeterminism for others
and the three possibilities for how they might treat un-
sharp measurements
(a′) Outcome determinism for all unsharp measure-
ments (abbreviated ODUM)
(b′) Outcome indeterminism for all unsharp measure-
ments
(c′) Outcome determinism for some unsharp measure-
ments and outcome indeterminism for others
It turns out that for ontological models of operational
quantum theory, a noncontextual representation of sharp
measurements must be outcome-deterministic, i.e., op-
tion (a), and a noncontextual representation of unsharp
measurements must be outcome-indeterministic, i.e., op-
tion (b′). Indeed, this is the main positive result of our
article, which we summarize in the following theorem.
4There is a subtlety in our choice of terminology which might
lead to confusion. For a set of response functions to be consid-
ered outcome-indeterministic, it is sufficient for a single response
function in the set to be outcome-indeterministic. Hence, every set
of response functions is either outcome-deterministic or outcome-
indeterministic. On the other hand, for a given class of measure-
ments to be considered outcome-indeterministic, it is necessary
for every measurement in the class to be outcome-indeterministic.
Consequently, we might have neither outcome-determinism nor
outcome-indeterminism for a given class.
5Theorem 3 In order to reproduce certain simple fea-
tures of operational quantum theory (specifically, the fea-
tures P1 and P2 outlined in Sec. IV) any ontological
model that is noncontextual in the sense of definition 1
must be such that a measurement is represented outcome-
deterministically if and only if it is sharp.
The proof of this theorem, as well as a discussion of its
signficance, is provided in Sec. IV. First, however, we
consider the question raised in the introduction concern-
ing whether considerations parallel to Fine’s theorem can
justify ODUM.
III. THE INTUITION IN FAVOUR OF ODUM
AND WHY IT IS MISTAKEN
The most compelling (albeit incorrect) argument in
favour of ODUM has the following structure.
Premiss 1: If two measurements are statis-
tically indistinguishable for all preparations,
then they are represented in the ontological
model by the same set of response functions
(this is the assumption of measurement non-
contextuality).
Premiss 2: Every measurement represented
in the ontological model by an outcome-
indeterministic set of response functions on
the system can also be represented by an
outcome-deterministic set of response func-
tions on a composite of the system and an
ancilla.
Purported conclusion: If two measure-
ments are statistically indistinguishable for
all preparations, then they can be repre-
sented in the ontological model by the same
outcome-deterministic set of response func-
tions.
The flaw in the argument is not in the premisses; if
these are clarified appropriately, they are correct. It is
that the conclusion does not follow from the premisses.
To get a feeling for why one ought to be suspicious of
the implication, consider the following analogous argu-
ment.
Premiss: If two measurements are statisti-
cally indistinguishable for all preparations,
then they are represented in quantum theory
by the same POVM.
Premiss: Every measurement represented in
quantum theory by a POVM on the sys-
tem can be represented by a projector-valued
measure on a composite of the system and an
ancilla (this is Naimark’s theorem [18]).
Purported conclusion: If two measure-
ments are statistically indistinguishable for
all preparations, then they can be represented
in quantum theory by the same projector-
valued measure.
Here it is clear that the two premisses are true but the
conclusion is false. Two measurements procedures on sys-
tem+ancilla might be represented by different projector-
valued measures, while they nonetheless reduce to the
same POVM on the system and are therefore statisti-
cally indistinguishable relative to all preparations of the
system. This analogy is meant only to give a sense of
where the problem lies.
In the following, we will make an assumption about
how the ontological model treats composite systems,
namely, that the ontic state space of the composite is
the Cartesian product of the ontic state spaces of the
components. For instance, if system s has ontic state
space Λs and ancilla a has ontic state space Λa then the
composite has ontic state space Λsa = Λs ×Λa. This as-
sumption has been called separability [19] or kinematical
locality [20].
We argue that the premisses and the conclusion of the
argument in favour of ODUM should be made precise as
follows:
Premiss 1′: If two measurements on a sys-
tem s are statistically indistinguishable rela-
tive to all preparations on s, then they are
represented in the ontological model by the
same set of response functions on Λs (this is
the assumption of measurement noncontextu-
ality applied to system s).
Premiss 2′: Every measurement on a system
s that is represented in the ontological model
by an outcome-indeterministic set of response
functions on Λs can also be understood as the
effective measurement arising from a prepa-
ration of an ancilla a and a measurement on
system+ancilla sa where the latter is repre-
sented by an outcome-deterministic set of re-
sponse functions on Λs × Λa (the measure-
ment on sa is said to be the extension of the
one on s).
Purported conclusion: If two measurements
on a system s are statistically indistinguish-
able relative to all preparations on s, then the
two measurements on system+ancilla sa that
extend these can be represented ontologically
by the same outcome-deterministic set of re-
sponse function on Λs × Λa.
An explicit argument for premiss 2′ is provided in ap-
pendix A.5 Our task now is to show why the conclusion
does not follow. It suffices to note the following.
5Harrigan and Rudolph have also previously discussed ontolog-
ical models that assign ontic state spaces to the measurement ap-
paratus [21].
6Claim: If two measurements on a system
s are statistically indistinguishable relative
to all preparations on s, it may nonethe-
less be the case that the two measurements
on system+ancilla sa that are extensions of
these are statistically distinguishable for some
preparation on sa.
This claim is seen to be true simply by noting that
a given POVM can have two distinct Naimark exten-
sions, that is, there are multiple choices of projector-
valued measure on sa that yield the same POVM on s.
Although this fact is well-known, we provide an explicit
example in appendix B. It blocks the purported conclu-
sion because if two measurements on system+ancilla sa
are statistically distinguishable for some preparation on
sa, then they must be represented ontologically by dif-
ferent response functions on Λs × Λa.
The conclusion we draw from all of this is that one
can model a pair of measurements that are statistically
indistinguishable for all preparations on some system by
either:
(i) the same outcome-indeterministic set of response
functions on the system,
(ii) different outcome-deterministic sets of response
functions on system+ancilla.
So, it is true that one can always represent a measure-
ment by an outcome-deterministic set of response func-
tion if one wishes; this is done by incorporating other
degrees of freedom (for instance those of the apparatus)
in one’s description. However, in moving to such a rep-
resentation, one loses the warrant to apply the assump-
tion of measurement noncontextuality. In particular, al-
though two measurements on a system may be repre-
sented by the same POVM in quantum theory, this is
not enough to justify (via the assumption of measurement
noncontextuality) that they should be represented by the
same set of response functions on system+ancilla in the
ontological model. The latter conclusion would only be
justified if the two measurements were represented by the
same projector-valued measure on system+ancilla and
this is generally not the case.
We can investigate the possibility of a noncontextual
ontological model using either of conventions (i) or (ii). It
is useful to consider how one models an unsharp measure-
ments on system s, denoted Ms, within each convention.
Under convention (i), we confine our attention to the
ontic state space of system s, Λs, we assume outcome
indeterminism,
ξ (k|λ,Ms) ∈ [0, 1] ∀λ ∈ Λs, (5)
and we represent the assumption of measurement non-
contextuality as
If p(k|Ps,Ms) = p(k|Ps,M
′
s) ∀Ps ∈ Ps
then ξ (k|λ,Ms) = ξ (k|λ,M
′
s) ∀λ ∈ Λs. (6)
Under convention (ii), on the other hand, we expand
the ontic state space from that of the system to that
of system+ancilla, Λs × Λa, such that we can assume
outcome determinism,
ξ (k|λs, λa,Msa) ∈ {0, 1} ∀(λs, λa) ∈ Λa × Λa, (7)
but in this case we must represent the assumption of
measurement noncontextuality as
if p (k|Ps,Ms) = p (k|Ps,M
′
s) ∀Ps ∈ Ps,
then
∑
λa
µ (λa|Pa) ξ (k|λs, λa,Msa)
=
∑
λa
µ (λa|P
′
a) ξ (k|λs, λa,M
′
sa) ∀λs ∈ Λs. (8)
In Eq. (8), the expressions on either side of the equal-
ity in the consequent are the effective response func-
tions on the system. If we think of Eq. (8) as a con-
straint on the outcome-deterministic response functions
ξ (k|λs, λa,Msa) and ξ (k|λs, λa,M
′
sa), it is not simply a
constraint of equality of those response functions. The
more cumbersome nature of this constraint is the price
to pay for insisting on outcome-deterministic representa-
tions.
In appendix C we provide an explicit example of how,
for a particular pair of measurements on the system, each
measurement can be associated with a set of response
functions that are outcome-deterministic on an extended
system—via the scheme of appendix A—but the two sets
of response functions fail to be equivalent.
These two approaches to providing a noncontextual
ontological model are analogous to two approaches to
operational quantum theory known as the “church of
the larger Hilbert space” and the “church of the smaller
Hilbert space”6. In the former, preparations, measure-
ments, and transformations on a system are represented
respectively by pure states, projector-valued measures,
and unitary maps on system+ancilla, while in the lat-
ter, they are represented by mixed states, POVMs and
completely positive trace-preserving maps on the system
alone. Just as this choice is conventional—either can do
justice to the experimental statistics—so too is the choice
of whether to posit an ontological model on the system
alone or on system+ancilla. Indeed, it is appropriate to
refer to convention (ii) as the “church of the larger on-
tic state space” and convention (i) as “the church of the
smaller ontic state space”.
Conventions (i) and (ii) encode one and the same no-
tion of noncontextuality for unsharp measurements. The
point is that this notion is distinct from the one that is
recommended in Refs. [9–15].
We shall adopt convention (i), i.e. the church of the
smaller ontic state space, for the rest of the article.
6Terms coined by John Smolin and Matt Leifer respectively.
7IV. PROVING THAT OUTCOME
INDETERMINISM HOLDS FOR ALL AND ONLY
UNSHARP MEASUREMENTS
We will now prove Theorem 3, which asserts that, given
certain features of operational quantum theory, it fol-
lows that in a noncontextual ontological model (using
the notion of noncontextuality in definition 1) the set
of response functions associated with a measurement is
outcome-deterministic if and only if the measurement is
sharp, or equivalently, that it is outcome-indeterministic
if and only if the measurement is unsharp.
We divide the proof into two halves:
(a) if a measurement is sharp then it is represented
outcome-deterministically in a noncontextual on-
tological model,
as well as the converse of this implication, which in its
contrapositive form is
(b) if a measurement is unsharp then it is represented
outcome-indeterministically in a noncontextual on-
tological model,
For the proof of (a) we refer the reader to Sec. VIII.A
of Ref. [7]. As noted there, one needs the generalized
notion of noncontextuality from definition 1 to infer out-
come determinism for sharp measurements, specifically,
one needs the assumption of preparation noncontextu-
ality; the assumption of measurement noncontextuality
alone is insufficient to derive the result.
The features of operational quantum theory that are
used in the proof of (a) can be summarized as follows (as
one can infer from the details of the proof, as described
in Ref. [7]):
P1 For every sharp measurementM , and for each out-
come k of that measurement, there is a preparation
procedure PM,k that makes that outcome certain to
occur, that is, p(k|M,PM,k′) = δk,k′ . Furthermore,
for any two sharp measurements M and M ′, the
uniform mixture over k of the PM,k and the uni-
form mixture over k of the PM ′,k are statistically
indistinguishable relative to all measurements.
The proof of (b) is a novel contribution of this article.
The only sort of noncontextuality that is relevant here is
measurement noncontextuality.
In the course of the proof, we will make critical use
of the following fact: If it can be shown that one par-
ticular measurement procedure realizing a given POVM
must be represented outcome-indeterministically, then
in a noncontextual ontological model it follows that all
measurement procedures realizing that POVM must be
represented outcome-indeterministically. The reason is
that if the two measurement procedures realize the same
POVM, then according to operational quantum the-
ory, they are statistically indistinguishable relative to all
preparations, and the assumption of measurement non-
contextuality then implies that they must be represented
by the same set of response functions.
To begin, it is useful to note how post-processing of
measurements are represented in an ontological model.
These constraints have nothing to do with the assump-
tion of noncontextuality. They are constraints on any
ontological model, contextual or noncontextual.
Suppose a measurementM ′ is defined in terms of post-
processing of another measurement M as follows.
The procedure M ′ : Implement M and upon
obtaining outcome k, sample a random vari-
able j from a conditional probability distribu-
tion s(j|k). Finally, output j as the outcome
of the effective measurement.
Now consider how these measurements must be repre-
sented in an ontological model. If outcome k of mea-
surement M is represented by the response function
ξ(k|λ,M), the outcome j of measurement M ′ is repre-
sented by the response function
ξ (j|λ,M ′) =
∑
k
s (j|k) ξ(k|λ,M). (9)
This just follows from probability theory: we must sum
the probability of all the ways of getting outcome j in
measurement M ′. We therefore must take the sum over
k of the probability of getting outcome k in measurement
M and of then getting outcome j in the sampling, and
this latter probability is simply the product of the prob-
ability of getting outcome k in M and the probability of
getting j given k.
Note that coarse-graining of measurement outcomes is
a special case of post-processing. For instance, if one
wishes to coarse-grain all outcomes k in some subset S
to a single outcome j = j0, one simply chooses the con-
ditional such that s (j0|k) = 1 for all k ∈ S. In this
case,
ξ (j0|λ,M
′) =
∑
k∈S
ξ(k|λ,M). (10)
Therefore coarse-graining of outcomes in the operational
theory is represented by coarse-graining of the corre-
sponding response functions.
Now consider the operational equivalence class of mea-
surement events that are associated with a particu-
lar effect E. Denote the spectral resolution of E by
E =
∑
i siΠi where the Πi are projectors satisfying∑
iΠi = I. We can use the spectral resolution of E
to build up a measurement M ′ that has an outcome
that is in the equivalence class associated with E. First,
let M denote a sharp measurement associated with the
projector-valued measure {Πi}. Next, define M
′ to be a
post-processing ofM wherein the conditional probability
s(j|i) is chosen so that for some value of j, denoted j0, we
have s(j0|i) = si. The j0 outcome of measurement M
′
will then be associated with the effect
∑
i siΠi, which is
8E. Because of how post-processing is represented in an
ontological model (see Eq. (9)), we have
ξ(j0|λ,M
′) =
∑
i
siξ(i|λ,M). (11)
As emphasized above, the assumption of measurement
noncontextuality then implies that for every measure-
ment event associated with effect E, not just the event
corresponding to the j0 outcome of measurementM
′, the
response function for this event is the same. We denote
it by ξE(λ). Denoting the response function for the op-
erational equivalence class of the projector Πi by ξΠi(λ),
we infer from Eq. (11) that
ξE(λ) =
∑
i
siξΠi(λ). (12)
We are now in a position to demonstrate that all
unsharp measurements must be represented outcome-
indeterministically. If a quantum measurement is un-
sharp, then at least one of its outcomes is associated
with an effect that is not a projector. Call this effect
E and denote its spectral resolution by E =
∑
i siΠi as
before, so that its response function is given by Eq. (12).
The fact that E is not a projector implies that one of
its eigenvalues, say si0 , is such that 0 < si0 < 1. Given
that {Πi} is itself a POVM, it follows that
∑
i ξΠi(λ) = 1
in the ontological model (because for every λ, some out-
come of the measurement associated with {Πi} must oc-
cur). But si0 < 1 and
∑
i ξΠi(λ) = 1 together imply that∑
i siξΠi(λ) < 1. Finally, because there exist quantum
states that assign a nonzero probability to the i0 outcome
of the {Πi} measurement, it follows that the response
function associated with i0 must have nontrivial support
on the ontic state space. Hence, for every λ in this sup-
port, we have 0 <
∑
i siξΠi(λ) < 1, which implies that
0 < ξE(λ) < 1. So, ξE(λ) is outcome-indeterministic.
It is straightforward to verify that the features of op-
erational quantum theory that are used in the proof of
(b) are:
P2 For every unsharp measurement M ′, the measure-
ment event associated to any given outcome of M ′
can be realized by a post-processing of some sharp
measurement M where the post-processing is in-
trinsically probabilistic rather than deterministic.
In other words, if the outcomes ofM are labelled by
i, then there exists at least one such value, i0, such
that the conditional probability si0 of obtaining the
distinguished outcome ofM ′ given that outcome i0
was obtained for M satisfies 0 < si0 < 1.
This concludes the proof of theorem 3.
A. The significance of Theorem 3
It is worth commenting on how one should interpret
Thm. 3 given that it is known that operational quantum
theory does not admit of an ontological model that is
noncontextual in the sense of definition 1. In particular,
in Ref. [7], it was shown that preparation noncontextu-
ality alone implies a contradiction with the predictions
of operational quantum theory. As such, one might won-
der what is the use of characterizing how measurements
must be represented in noncontextual ontological models
of operational quantum theory, as Thm. 3 does, when
it is known that there are no such models.7 The an-
swer is that Thm. 3 is a tool for devising novel proofs of
the impossibility of a noncontextual ontological model of
quantum theory, in particular, proofs that make nontriv-
ial use of the assumption of measurement noncontextu-
ality. Indeed, two examples of such proofs are provided
in Sec. VII.
There are many benefits to having multiple different
proofs of the impossibility of a noncontextual ontologi-
cal model of operational quantum theory. After all, the
point of studying noncontextual ontological models is not
merely to rule them out, but to get a more complete pic-
ture of the sense in which operational quantum theory
differs from a classical theory.
It is perhaps easiest to appreciate this point by con-
sidering its analogue in the context of proofs of the in-
consistency of operational quantum theory and Bell’s as-
sumption of local causality. No one can deny that much
has been learned by exploring the possible paths that
such inferences might take, such as the proof provided by
Hardy [22] or the proof provided by Greenberger Horne
and Zeilinger [23]. Just as the different proofs of Bell’s
theorem vary in interesting ways, so too do the different
proofs of the impossibility of a noncontextual ontological
model of operational quantum theory.
Also, many of the information-processing advantages
of quantum theory can be proven to be connected to
the impossibility of a noncontextual model. The cryp-
tographic task of parity-oblivious multiplexing, a kind
of random access code, is an example [24]. It has also
recently been shown that quantum contextuality is a
resource in the magic state distilation model of fault-
tolerant quantum computation [25]. Understanding the
various different logical paths from the assumption of
noncontextuality to a contradiction is important for de-
termining which quantum information-processing tasks
might be powered by contextuality.
It is also worth noting that the particular features of
operational quantum theory that are needed to prove
Thm. 3, namely P1 and P2, are not by themselves suf-
ficient to derive a contradiction with the assumption of
a noncontextual ontological model. One requires addi-
tional features of operational quantum theory to obtain
the contradiction. To see that this is the case, it suf-
fices to show that there are subtheories of operational
quantum theory—that is, subsets of the full set of prepa-
7This question was posed by a referee of this article.
9rations and measurements—that satisfy P1 and P2 and
admit of a noncontextual ontological model.
One example is the stabilizer subtheory for qutrits [27].
This is the set of experiments on collections of three-level
quantum systems (qutrits) of the following form: the
preparations are those associated with stabilizer states
(density operators that are normalized projectors onto
an eigenspace of a commuting set of products of general-
ized Pauli operators); the sharp measurements are Pauli
measurements (those associated with a commuting set of
products of generalized Pauli operators), and the unsharp
measurements are those which have a Naimark extension
wherein the ancilla is prepared in a stabilizer state and
subjected to a Pauli measurement.
Another example is Gaussian quantum mechan-
ics [26]. This is the set of experiments on collections
of continuous-variable systems of the following form: the
preparations are those associated with Gaussian states
(density operators with Gaussian Wigner representa-
tion); the sharp measurements are those associated with
projector-valued measures every element of which has a
Gaussian Wigner representation; and the unsharp mea-
surements are those which have a Naimark extension
wherein the ancilla is prepared in a Gaussian state and
subjected to a sharp Gaussian measurement.
Both of these subtheories of operational quantum the-
ory satisfy P1 and P2 and therefore have the features
that are necessary for proving Thm. 3. However, unlike
the full quantum theory, they do admit of an ontological
model that is noncontextual in the sense of definition 1.
This follows from the fact that the preparations and mea-
surements in these subtheories have nonnegative Wigner
representations (in the stabilizer subtheory, it is the dis-
crete Wigner representation of Gross [27]) and the fact
that a nonnegative quasiprobability representation yields
a noncontextual ontological model, as shown in Ref. [28].
It follows from Thm. 3 that in these ontological models,
measurements are represented outcome-deterministically
if and only if they are sharp. By inspecting the noncon-
textual ontological models that the Wigner representa-
tion defines, one can verify that this is indeed the case.
V. CONSTRAINTS ON NONCONTEXTUAL
PROBABILITY-ASSIGNMENTS OVER EFFECTS
In quantum theory, two measurements are statistically
indistinguishable relative to all preparations if they are
represented by the same POVM. The POVMs, therefore,
describe the operational equivalence classes of measure-
ments. It follows that if a measurementM is represented
by the POVM {Ek}, then measurement noncontextuality
implies that the set of response functions representingM
can be labelled by the POVM alone, i.e. no other details
of the measurement procedure need to be specified,
ξ(k|λ,M) = ξ(k|λ, {Ek}). (13)
In fact, measurement noncontextuality implies a fur-
ther simplification, namely, that the kth response func-
tion can be labelled by the kth element of the POVM
alone, that is,
ξ(k|λ,M) = ξEk(λ). (14)
The proof is straightforward. Consider a measurement
M ′ that is obtained from M by coarse-graining all out-
comes k 6= k0. Suppose outcome k0 of M maps to out-
come 0 of M ′ and any outcome k 6= k0 of M maps to
outcome 1 of M ′. It is clear that M ′ is then associ-
ated with the two-outcome POVM {Ek0 , I − Ek0}. We
can therefore label the response functions of M ′ by this
POVM,
ξ(j|λ,M ′) = ξ(j|λ, {Ek0 , I − Ek0}). (15)
Meanwhile, by the definition of M ′,
ξ(k0|λ,M) = ξ(0|λ,M
′), (16)
and therefore
ξ(k0|λ,M) = ξ(0|λ, {Ek0 , I − Ek0}). (17)
However, given that the POVM {Ek0 , I − Ek0} is com-
pletely specified by specifying Ek0 , it suffices to label the
response function by Ek0 ,
ξ(k0|λ,M) = ξEk0 (λ), (18)
which is what we set out to prove.
It follows from this analysis that in a noncontextual
ontological model of operational quantum theory, the
response function associated with a given outcome of a
quantum measurement depends only on the POVM ele-
ment associated to that outcome.
In the rest of this section, we will show how our pro-
posal for how to model unsharp measurements in a non-
contextual ontological model can be expressed as a set of
constraints on probability-assignments to effects, rather
than in terms of constraints on response functions. This
manner of expressing the proposal is in some respects eas-
ier to grasp and clarifies how it contrasts with alternative
proposals.
We begin with the traditional notion of noncontextu-
ality, which, as mentioned in the introduction, applies
only to sharp measurements. In terms of the notions
introduced here, it is the conjunction of the assump-
tion of measurement noncontextuality and the assump-
tion of outcome determinism for all sharp measurements.
Specifically, if M is a sharp measurement with outcomes
labelled by k and associated with the projector-valued
measure {Πk}, then, specializing Eq. (14) to projectors,
measurement noncontextuality implies that
ξ(k|λ,M) = ξΠk(λ). (19)
Meanwhile, outcome determinism for sharp measure-
ments implies that
ξΠk(λ) ∈ {0, 1}. (20)
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The traditional assumption of noncontextuality can
also be expressed in terms of constraints on the 0-1 valua-
tion of projectors for a fixed ontic state. It is straightfor-
ward to verify that this formulation follows from the one
in terms of response functions that we have just given.
Let v(Π) denote the value assigned to projector Π by a
fixed ontic state λ, i.e. v(Π) = ξΠ(λ) ∈ {0, 1}. Tradi-
tional noncontextuality then asserts that for every ontic
state, the following conditions hold:
KS1 Each projector Π is assigned a value 0 or 1, v(Π) ∈
{0, 1},
KS2 For each pair of projectors Π1,Π2, if Π = Π1 + Π2
is also a projector, then v(Π) = v(Π1) + v(Π2),
KS3 The identity operator is assigned the value 1,
v(I) = 1.
The second item implies that orthogonal projectors can-
not both receive the value 1, and the third implies that
for any set of projectors that form a resolution of identity,
exactly one of them must be assigned the value 1.8
We now reconsider the question of how to model
unsharp measurements in a noncontextual ontological
model from the perspective of valuations over effects.
The proposal of Refs. [9–15] is that all effects, even
the nonprojective ones, should receive 0-1 valuations for
a fixed ontic state and that these should satisfy the same
constraints as do the 0-1 valuations of projectors:
1 Each effect E is assigned a value 0 or 1, v(E) ∈
{0, 1},
2 For each pair of effects E1, E2, if E = E1 + E2 is
also an effect, then v(E) = v(E1) + v(E2),
3 The identity operator is assigned the value 1,
v(I) = 1.
These constraints imply that for every POVM, precisely
one effect must receive the value 1 and the others 0.
In our approach, on the other hand, nonprojective ef-
fects are not assigned deterministic values, but only prob-
abilities. Nonetheless, one can express our proposal in
8It is tempting to think that constraints KS1-KS3 are the con-
tent of the assumption of traditional noncontextuality, but this is
inaccurate. Rather, the assumption of measurement noncontex-
tuality is a prerequisite to KS1-KS3 making any sense. It is this
assumption that warrants positing a function v that depends only
on the projector associated with a measurement outcome. So once
one is discussing the properties of a valuation over projectors, the
assumption of noncontextuality has already done its work. KS2
then follows from how one must represent coarse-graining in an
ontological model (given by Eq. (10)), KS3 follows from the fact
that for every measurement, the sum of probabilities of all the out-
comes must be 1, and KS1 encodes the assumption of outcome
determinism for sharp measurements.
terms of constraints on the probability-assignments to ef-
fects. Recall that an effect E is a positive operator sat-
isfying 0 ≤ E ≤ I. Let w(E) denote the probability as-
signed to effect E by a fixed ontic state. The constraints
on probability assignments to effects are:
NC1 Each effect E is assigned a probability, w(E) ∈
[0, 1],
NC2 For each pair of effects E1, E2, if E = E1 + E2 is
also an effect, then w(E) = w(E1) + w(E2),
NC3 For each effect E and for any s satisfying 0 ≤ s ≤ 1,
if sE is an effect, then w(sE) = sw(E).
NC4 The identity operator is assigned unit probability,
w(I) = 1.
NC5 w(E) ∈ {0, 1} if and only if the effect E is a pro-
jector, i.e. E2 = E.
We now demonstrate how these constraints can be jus-
tified under the assumption of noncontextuality in the
sense of definition 1. To translate from ‘response func-
tion’ language to ‘probability assignment’ language, we
simply note that an effect E describes an operational
equivalence class of measurement events and the proba-
bility assignment to E for ontic state λ is the value of the
associated response function at λ, that is, w(E) = ξE(λ).
In particular, if outcome k of measurement M is in the
equivalence class of measurement events associated with
E, then w(E) = ξ(k|M,λ).
NC1 then follows from the fact that ξ(k|M,λ) is a
probability.
NC2 is simply a consequence of the representation of
coarse-graining in an ontological model. The equality
E = E1 + E2 implies that E1 and E2 can be associated
with two distinct outcomes of a single measurement, and
that the coarse-graining of that pair of outcomes is as-
sociated with the effect E. However, if two outcomes of
a measurement are coarse-grained into a single outcome,
then the probability for the latter given ontic state λ is
simply the sum of the probabilities for each of the former
given λ (see Eq. (10)).
NC3 is a consequence of the representation of post-
processing in an ontological model. Suppose the effect E
is associated with the measurement event corresponding
to implementing the measurement procedure M and ob-
taining the outcome k. Now define a measurement proce-
dure,M ′, as a post-processing ofM as follows: M ′ yields
outcome 0 with probability s if M yields outcome k.
Clearly, the effect associated with outcome 0 of measure-
mentM ′ is then sE. We have already seen how to repre-
sent post-processing in an ontological model (see Eq. (9)).
From this, we infer that ξ(0|M ′, λ) = sξ(k|M,λ), but
given that w(E) = ξ(k|M,λ) and w(sE) = ξ(0|M ′, λ),
we have that w(sE) = sw(E).
NC4 follows from the fact that the probabilities as-
signed to the outcomes of any measurement must sum to
1.
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Finally, NC5 follows from theorem 3. The only sub-
tlety in making this inference is that theorem 3 concerns
the representation of the outcomes of sharp measure-
ments and hence the representation of projectors that ap-
pear in POVMs all of whose elements are projectors while
NC5 refers to a single measurement event associated with
a projector, even if that projector appears in a POVM
alongside nonprojective effects. We bridge the gap by
noting that measurement noncontextuality implies that
the response function associated with a projector is the
same regardless of what measurement that projector is
considered a part of (as implied by Eq. (19)). Because a
projector is represented outcome-deterministically when
it is part of a sharp measurement (by theorem 3), it must
be represented outcome-deterministically even when it is
part of an unsharp measurement.
It is worth noting a few facts about this set of con-
straints.
First, NC2, NC4 and NC5 together imply KS1, KS2
and KS3, so the usual constraints on how to represent
projectors in a noncontextual ontological model are re-
covered as special cases of our constraints on how to
represent arbitrary effects in a noncontextual ontologi-
cal model.
It is also useful to note that the constraints NC1-NC5
are equivalent to the following set:
NC1′ Each effect E is assigned a probability equal to one
of the eigenvalues of E, w(E) ∈ spec(E),
NC2′ For each pair of effects E1, E2 and for each pair of
reals s1, s2 satisfying 0 ≤ s1, s2 ≤ 1, if s1E1+ s2E2
is an effect, then w(s1E1 + s2E2) = s1w(E1) +
s2w(E2).
Equivalence is easy to prove. It is trivial to see that
NC1, NC4 and NC5 all follow from NC1′, while NC2 and
NC3 follow from NC2′. Conversely, NC2′ follows trivially
from NC2 and NC3. Finally, NC1′ is derived from NC1-
NC5 using the same logic that is used in the proof of
theorem 3. Any effect E has a spectral resolution of the
form E =
∑
i siΠi (where
∑
iΠi = I) and therefore, by
NC2′, w(E) =
∑
i siw(Πi). However, NC2, NC4 and
NC5 imply that w(Πi) = 1 for precisely one value of i
and is zero otherwise (perhaps the easiest way to see this
is by noting that NC2, NC4 and NC5 imply KS1, KS2
and KS3), and this in turn implies that w(E) = si for
some value of i. Hence, w(E) ∈ spec(E).
In Sec. VII, we will show how this manner of character-
izing the consequences of noncontextuality for ontological
models of quantum theory allows one to simplify existing
no-go theorems. Before doing so, however, we make use
of this distinction between 0-1 valuations and probability
assignments to frame our final criticisms of ODUM.
VI. A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE STATUS
OF ODUM IN A NONCONTEXTUAL MODEL
The compelling but incorrect argument for ODUM
that we considered in Sec. III is, in our estimation, the
most likely reason that many researchers have assumed
ODUM without question. We hope, therefore, that our
critique of this argument is sufficient to convince such
researchers to abandon it. Nonetheless, we have also
shown in Sec. V that the assumption of noncontextuality
in definition 1 explicitly implies the failure of ODUM. In
this section, we provide a few more arguments against
ODUM. We present these as a dialogue between the au-
thor and an imaginary proponent of ODUM.9 This pro-
vides a more direct confrontation between our approach
and the proposal of Refs. [9–15]. Such arguments may
seem redundant at this point, but given that the ODUM
proposal has been revived several times by various au-
thors, we feel that it may be prudent to drive a few more
nails into its coffin.
We begin by repeating the argument against ODUM
that was made in Ref. [7].
author: Consider a measurement procedure M as-
sociated with the POVM { 12I,
1
2I}. For any
quantum state ρ, we have tr(ρ 12I) =
1
2 , there-
fore this measurement always has equal prob-
ability of producing either of its two out-
comes, regardless of the preparation proce-
dure. Clearly then, one way of implementing
this measurement is as follows: completely ig-
nore the system and just flip a fair coin to de-
termine the outcome. Call this measurement
procedure M, and consider how it must be
represented in an ontological model. Because
the outcome doesn’t depend on the system at
all, it follows that regardless of the system’s
ontic state λ, there is a probability of 1/2 for
each outcome, so it is represented by the set
of response functions { 12 ,
1
2} where each ele-
ment should be thought of as a uniform func-
tion over λ of height 12 . The outcomes are
clearly not deterministic given λ, so outcome
determinism fails to hold.
proponent of odum: Yes, but there are other
measurement procedures associated with the
POVM
{
1
2I,
1
2I
}
and one of these may be
represented by an outcome-deterministic re-
sponse function.
author: The problem with this response is that
measurement noncontextuality (in the sense
9We do not claim that any actual proponent of ODUM would
make the arguments that are made by our imaginary proponent.
Nonetheless, certain parts of our dialogue are inspired by various
proposals for how to define a notion of noncontextuality for unsharp
measurements, as we note explicitly throughout.
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of definition 1) requires that a POVM be rep-
resented by the same set of response func-
tions regardless of which particular measure-
ment procedure is used to implement it. It
therefore suffices to find just one measure-
ment procedure for the POVM that must
be represented outcome-indeterministically
to infer that in a noncontextual ontologi-
cal model, all measurement procedures for
this POVM must be represented outcome-
indeterministically.
proponent of odum: That may be, but it seems
to me significant that one can find sets of un-
sharp measurements, which, unlike the fair
coin flip POVM have a nontrivial dependence
on the system, and for which it is impos-
sible to find a noncontextual and outcome-
deterministic representation. Here’s an ex-
ample of three such POVMs (due to M. Naka-
mura, who was inspired by a similar example
due to Cabello, both of which are reported in
Ref. [10]):
{ 12E,
1
2 (I − E),
1
2F,
1
2 (I − F )},
{ 12E,
1
2 (I − E),
1
2G,
1
2 (I −G)},
{ 12F,
1
2 (I − F ),
1
2G,
1
2 (I −G)}. (21)
ODUM implies that for a given λ every ef-
fect must be assigned a value of 0 or 1, while
measurement noncontextuality implies that
an effect receives the same value regardless
of where it occurs. The contradiction is ob-
tained by noting that only one effect in each
POVM can be assigned the value 1, imply-
ing an odd number of 1s, but every effect ap-
pears in two POVMs so that a noncontextual
assignment must assign an even number of 1s.
Such proofs make use of details of the struc-
ture of quantum measurements. Doesn’t
their existence show that ODUM is an inter-
esting assumption?
author: No, they don’t. If we assume ODUM,
then the fair coin flip POVM is already suf-
ficient for deriving the contradiction. Given
that the two effects in the fair coin flip POVM
are the same, measurement noncontextuality
requires that we assign them the same value.
But we can’t assign them both the value 0
because this would say that neither outcome
occurs, and we can’t assign them both the
value 1 because this would say that both out-
comes occur. We have our contradiction.
So we see that proofs of the type described
above are unnecessarily complicated: a con-
sideration of the fair coin flip POVM { 12I,
1
2I}
yields the result immediately. The fact
that the contradiction can be obtained by
a completely trivial argument speaks against
ODUM.10
proponent of odum: Thinking it over, I’ve re-
fined my view on the matter. The problem
isn’t with ODUM, the problem is with your
definition of measurement noncontextuality.
It’s too strong. The proper notion of mea-
surement noncontextuality for unsharp mea-
surements should demand that equivalent ef-
fects are represented by equivalent response
functions only when these effects appear in
distinct POVMs. Measurement noncontex-
tuality should not require equivalent repre-
sentations for equivalent effects if these ap-
pear in the same POVM. In other words, we
need only eliminate context-dependence be-
tween but not within measurements.
author: In my view, the motivation behind the
assumption of measurement noncontextuality
is that statistical indistinguishability relative
to all preparations should imply statistical in-
distinguishability relative to all ontic states,
therefore events that have the same statis-
tics for all preparations should be represented
equivalently in the ontological model, even if
they correspond to distinct outcomes of a sin-
gle measurement.
But in any case, even if we consider your sug-
gested modification of the notion of measure-
ment noncontextuality, it is still trivial to ob-
tain a contradiction. Consider the fair coin
flip POVM {E1, E2} where E1 = E2 =
1
2I
together with another POVM containing 12I,
say {F1, F2, F3} where F1 =
1
2I and F2 =
p
2I, F3 =
1−p
2 I. According to the notion of
measurement noncontextuality that you pro-
pose, we must require F1 to take the same
value as E1, but by the same token we must
also require F1 to take the same value as E2.
This implies that E1 and E2 must take the
same value, and so we are back to applying
ODUM directly to the fair coin flip POVM
and obtaining a contradiction trivially.
10Grudka and Kurzynski [29] have also criticized the notion of
noncontextuality used in the Cabello-Nakamura proofs. They ar-
gue that in a noncontextual model, one should only assign deter-
ministic values to the projectors that appear in a Naimark exten-
sion of the POVM, rather than the POVM elements themselves. It
then suffices to note that the projector that extends a given effect
varies with the POVM in which that effect appears, and therefore
that a noncontextual model does not assign a unique determinis-
tic value to a given effect. In the language of the present article,
they argue that a noncontextual and outcome-deterministic value-
assignment to projectors on system+ancilla does not imply a non-
contextual and outcome-deterministic value-assignment to effects
on the system. This attitude is entirely consistent with the view
espoused here.
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proponent of odum: Fine, given this example, I
propose that the assumption of measurement
noncontextuality together with ODUM sim-
ply cannot be applied to any POVM wherein
the same effect appears twice.11
author: Ah, but this move won’t help either; un-
der this new notion one can still construct
a contradiction essentially trivially. Con-
sider the POVM { p2I,
1−p
2 I,
q
2I,
1−q
2 I}, where
0 < p, q < 1, p, q 6= 12 and p 6= q. Suppose
that it is coarse-grained in one of two ways:
either one coarse-grains the first pair of out-
comes, in which case the resulting POVM is
{ 12I,
q
2I,
1−q
2 I}, or one coarse-grains the last
pair of outcomes, in which case the result-
ing POVM is { p2I,
1−p
2 I,
1
2I}. Now recall that
coarse-graining at the operational level is rep-
resented by coarse-graining at the ontological
level, that is, if v(E) is the value assigned to
effect E by an ontic state λ, then v(E1+E2) =
v(E1) + v(E2). Assuming ODUM, precisely
one of the four effects in { p2I,
1−p
2 I,
q
2I,
1−q
2 I}
must receive the value 1, but then upon
coarse-graining, the effect 12I will receive dif-
ferent values depending on whether it is con-
sidered in the context of { 12I,
q
2I,
1−q
2 I} or of
{ p2I,
1−p
2 I,
1
2I}. For instance, if v
(
p
2I
)
= 1
while v(1−p2 I) = v(
q
2I) = v(
1−q
2 I) = 0, then
in the context of the first coarse-graining,
v(12I) = v
(
p
2I
)
+ v
(
1−p
2 I
)
= 1, while in
the context of the second coarse-graining,
v(12I) = v
(
q
2I
)
+ v
(
1−q
2 I
)
= 0. The same
example would of course not yield a contra-
diction if we did not assume ODUM.
proponent of odum: You know, I can avoid all
of these problems by adopting the following
notion of noncontextuality for unsharp mea-
surements: one is only required to assign
outcome-deterministic response functions to
effects that cannot appear more than once in
a given POVM, that is, effects E satisfying
E > 12I. Given that all of your criticisms of
ODUM make use of the effect 12I, and this
does not fulfill the conditions for applicabil-
ity of such a notion of noncontextuality, your
criticisms would no longer apply.12
author: Isn’t this starting to feel like epicycles to
you? In any case, a good operational notion
of noncontextuality should apply to any mea-
surement. If some proposed notion of non-
contextuality for unsharp measurements ne-
cessitates a restriction on the sorts of mea-
11This proposal was considered by Methot [13].
12This notion was considered by Bacon, Toner and Ben-Or [30]
and reported by Methot [13].
surement to which it can be applied, then
it hasn’t really addressed the problem that
needs to be solved. If one wants to be able
to say, of any given experiment, whether it
admits of a noncontextual model or not, the
definition of noncontextuality must be able to
cover all cases.
proponent of odum: Well if you insist on a defi-
nition that covers all possible measurements,
then I’m just going to bite the bullet: my
original idea of assuming ODUM in addition
to the general notion of measurement noncon-
textuality was right all along and the impos-
sibility of such an ontological model is indeed
trivial to demonstrate. If your intuitions sug-
gested that such proofs should be nontrivial,
well then, these examples only demonstrate
how wrong those intuitions were.
author: This is a possible position, but it does not
have much to recommend it. Recall that non-
contextuality no-go theorems based on sharp
measurements, such as the original Kochen-
Specker theorem, make critical use of struc-
tural differences between the set of quantum
measurements and the set of classical mea-
surements. All of the trivial no-go theorems
I’ve provided above are based on POVMs
wherein every element is proportional to the
identity operator. Every such POVM boils
down to sampling from a probability distri-
bution, yielding outcome statistics that are
completely independent of the preparation
procedure. But of course a classical opera-
tional theory also admits of noisy measure-
ments that just correspond to sampling from
a probability distribution and yield outcome
statistics that are independent of the prepa-
ration procedure. Therefore, these trivial no-
go theorems do not rely on any intrinsically
quantum features of the measurements.
proponent of odum: Maybe what this shows is
that we can obtain a no-go result for noncon-
textuality even for classical operational the-
ories!
author: I take it to be a point in favour of
not assuming ODUM that ontological mod-
els of classical operational theories are always
found to be noncontextual in the sense of def-
inition 1. The whole point of these kinds of
investigations is to identify the ways in which
quantum theories and classical theories dif-
fer, so a good notion of noncontextuality is
one that can do justice to the difference.
proponent of odum: Well, in the end, it’s just a
question of semantics what one decides to call
“noncontextual”. I want to give the name
to one kind of model, you want to give it to
another.
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author: I don’t agree that the debate is just about
semantics. There are criteria by which we
can judge different proposed generalizations
of the notion of noncontextuality: coherence
and usefulness.
This article has sought to demonstrate that
the generalized notion of measurement non-
contextuality proposed in Ref. [7], wherein
unsharp measurements are associated with
outcome-indeterministic response functions,
is coherent. It reduces to the traditional no-
tion of noncontextuality for sharp measure-
ments and does justice to the manner in
which unsharp measurements can be related
to sharp measurements, for instance, when
one is a post-processing of the other.
The proposed notion of noncontextuality also
fulfils the criterion of usefulness insofar as it
allows us to clarify the ways in which classi-
cal and quantum theories differ. Indeed, cer-
tain information-processing tasks can be im-
plemented better in operational theories that
do not admit of an ontological model that
is noncontextual in the sense of definition 1,
such as the task of parity-oblivious multiplex-
ing described in Ref. [24]. A definition of
noncontextuality that does not cleanly dis-
tinguish between classical operational theo-
ries and quantum operational theories is less
useful than one that does.
[End scene.]
VII. DISCUSSION
This article has focussed on the question of how to for-
mulate the notion of noncontextuality for unsharp mea-
surements. This informs the question of whether one can
rule out a noncontextual model of quantum theory using
a proof that appeals explicitly to unsharp measurements.
Although there are several results in the literature that
claim to have done precisely this [9–13], these have all
assumed ODUM. This assumption does not follow from
an assumption of noncontextuality, however, and conse-
quently in the face of a contradiction, one can choose to
abandon ODUM in order to salvage noncontextuality. In
our view, therefore, these proofs do not deserve to be
called no-go theorems for noncontextuality.
Nonetheless, it is possible to construct a no-go theo-
rem for noncontextuality for a single qubit without the
assumption of ODUM: this was done in Sec. V of Ref. [7],
where two such proofs are presented, one based on a fi-
nite set of measurements on a qubit and another that
is based on a version of Gleason’s theorem for unsharp
measurements that applies to two-dimensional Hilbert
spaces, proven by Busch [9] and by Caves et al. [11].
We repeat these proofs here, using the characterization
of noncontextuality in terms of probability assignments
to effects (NC1′ and NC2′ in Sec. V), which simplifies
them substantially.
First, the discrete proof. Consider the trine POVM
{ 23Π1,
2
3Π2,
2
3Π3}, where Π1,Π2 and Π3 are the rank-1
projectors which in the Bloch-sphere representation cor-
respond to three vectors in a plane separated from one
another by angles of 120◦, so that
2
3Π1 +
2
3Π2 +
2
3Π3 = I. (22)
The assumption of a noncontextual model (via NC2′) im-
plies that the probability assignment over effects induced
by an ontic state must satisfy
2
3w(Π1) +
2
3w(Π2) +
2
3w(Π3) = w(I). (23)
However, the assumption of a noncontextual model (via
NC1′) also implies that w(I) = 1 while each of w(Π1),
w(Π2) and w(Π3) must take the value 0 or 1. However,
no such assignment in consistent with Eq. (23), so we
have derived a contradiction. Note that this proof makes
use of the distinctive features of the space of quantum
effects.
The Gleason-like proof is also straightforward. NC2′
implies that any probability assignment w to the effects is
convex-linear in the effects. By a standard argument [9,
11], it can therefore be extended to a linear function over
Hermitian operators and hence represented as the inner
product with another Hermitian operator. Denoting this
operator by ρ, and recalling that the Hilbert-Schmidt
inner product between Hermitian operators A and B is
tr(AB), we have w(E) = tr(ρE). The fact that w(E) is
required to be positive for all E implies that ρ must be a
positive operator, and the fact that we require w(I) = 1
implies that tr(ρ) = 1, therefore ρ is a density operator.
To get a contradiction, it then suffices to note that there
is no density operator that assigns to every effect a value
from its spectrum. In particular, there is no quantum
state that assigns values 0 or 1 to every projector.
Another single-qubit no-go theorem for noncontextual-
ity has been provided recently by Kunjwal and Ghosh [31]
who demonstrate a violation of a noncontextuality in-
equality derived in Ref. [32] for a triple of nonprojective
qubit POVMs that are jointly measurable pairwise but
not triplewise.
One consequence of our analysis is that the restric-
tion of previous no-go theorems for noncontextuality to
Hilbert spaces of dimension 3 or greater was an artifact of
having a notion of noncontextuality that was limited to
sharp measurements. For a qubit, there is only a single
measurement context in which any given rank-1 projec-
tor can appear, namely, together with its unique rank-1
orthogonal complement. Hence, there is no possibility of
a nontrivial variation of the context in which a projector
appears and hence no possibility of context-dependence
either. When one considers unsharp measurements, on
the other hand, there are nontrivial contexts: a given
nonprojective POVM may be realized as a convex com-
bination of other measurements in multiple ways, as a
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post-processing of other measurements in multiple ways,
and by reduction of another measurement in multiple
ways. However, for unsharp measurements, achieving a
noncontextual model is not about assigning outcomes in
a context-independent fashion, it is about assigning prob-
abilities of outcomes in a context-independent fashion.
Finally, a few words are in order regarding the motiva-
tion that we provided for our investigation—determining
whether experimental statistics can be explained by a
noncontextual ontological model, irrespective of the truth
of quantum theory. This article has not addressed this
question directly; we have only considered the constraints
on noncontextual ontological models of quantum theory.
The distinction between sharp and unsharp measure-
ments, for instance, is defined in terms of quantum con-
cepts. What our analysis demonstrates, however, is that
one should never simply assume that the noncontextual
representation of some measurement should be outcome-
deterministic. Rather, this needs to be justified. As we
have noted, Ref. [7] demonstrated that one can justify
outcome-deterministic representations of sharp measure-
ments in quantum theory from preparation noncontextu-
ality and from certain facts about the quantum statistics.
In the context of exploring whether given experimen-
tal data can be explained by a noncontextual ontologi-
cal model, any assumptions of outcome-determinism will
similarly need to be justified by assumptions of noncon-
textuality and by appeal to facts about the experimental
statistics. Or, more precisely, the degree of indetermin-
ism posited for some noncontextual representation of a
measurement needs to be so justified. An example of
a noncontextuality inequality for experimental statistics
wherein the degree of indeterminism is justified in this
manner will be provided elsewhere [33].
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Appendix A: Ontological extension: modelling an
unsharp measurement using an
outcome-deterministic response function
The intuition at play in premiss 2 of the argument
from Sec. III is that one can always imagine any sub-
jective uncertainty in the outcome of a measurement on
some system s as being due to uncertainty about the
ontic state of some other system that, together with s,
determines the outcome, for instance, hidden variables
in the apparatus. We will see that this is indeed the
case. The resulting representation of the measurement
will be called an ontological extension. This is the ana-
logue, within the ontological model, of the Naimark ex-
tension of a measurement within operational quantum
theory. 13
Suppose that for an operational theory (P ,M, p) on
system s, we have found a (possibly contextual) onto-
logical model (Λs, µ, ξ) on s, such that the operational
statistics are reproduced as
p(k|M,P ) =
∑
λs∈Λs
µ(λs|P )ξ(k|λs,M). (A1)
We suppose that the ontological model is outcome-
indeterministic, so that 0 < ξ(k|λs,M) < 1 for some
λs.
We can define a new model with outcome-deterministic
response functions as follows. Introduce an ancilla sys-
tem a with ontic state space equal to the unit interval
(hence continuous), that is, Λa = [0, 1]. The ontic state
space of the composite is then Λsa ≡ Λs×Λa. Now define
µ(λs, λa) ≡ µ(λs|P )µ0(λa), (A2)
where µ0(λa) is the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Also,
define
ω0(λs) = 0, (A3)
ωk(λs) =
k∑
j=1
ξ(j|λs,M), (A4)
and define outcome-deterministic response functions on
Λs × Λa by
ξ (k|λs, λa) ≡
{
1 if ωk−1(λs) ≤ λa ≤ ωk(λs)
0 otherwise
. (A5)
13Just as one can define a quantum Naimark extension by adjoin-
ing an ancilla to one’s system or by considering the system to be
a subspace of a larger system, so too can one define an ontological
Naimark extension in either way. We’ll use the ancilla construction
here. It is possible that one could dispense with the assumption of
separability if one used the subspace construction, but we do not
seek to answer the question here.
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The new model is empirically adequate because
∑
λs∈Λs
∫
Λa
dλa µ(λs, λa)ξ(k|λs, λa) (A6)
=
∑
λs∈Λs
µ(λs|P )
∫ ωk(λs)
ωk−1(λs)
dλa µ0 (λa) (A7)
=
∑
λs∈Λs
µ(λs|P ) [ωk(λs)− ωk−1(λs)] (A8)
=
∑
λs∈Λs
µ(λs|P )ξ(k|λs,M) (A9)
= p (k|P,M) . (A10)
A similar trick for devising an ontological model that
is outcome-deterministic was described by Bell [1] and
its relevance for eliminating determinism as an assump-
tion in the proof of Bell’s theorem was emphasized by
Fine [16]. It follows that one can always extend an
ontological model such that it represents measurements
outcome-deterministically if one so wishes. This justifies
premiss 2′ of the second argument in Sec. III.
Appendix B: The multiplicity of Naimark extensions
of a POVM and its significance for ontological
models
We here show explicitly that a given POVM can have
two distinct Naimark extensions, that is, that there are
multiple distinct choices of projective measurement on
sa that yield the same POVM on s. Specifically, we con-
struct two Naimark extensions of the fair coin flip POVM
{ 12I,
1
2I} (discussed in Sec. VI).
The first Naimark extension is as follows. We imple-
ment a preparation of the ancilla corresponding to the
mixed state
ρa =
1
3 |1〉 〈1|+
1
3 |2〉 〈2|+
1
3 |3〉 〈3| .
The measurement on sa is the binary-outcome projector-
valued measure {Πsa, I −Πsa}, where
Πsa ≡ Πs,1 ⊗ |1〉 〈1|+Πs,2 ⊗ |2〉 〈2|+Πs,3 ⊗ |3〉 〈3| .
(B1)
where Πs,i ≡ |ψi〉 〈ψi| and {|ψi〉 : i ∈ {1, 2, 3}} are a
triple pure states on the system s with pairwise overlaps
|〈ψi|ψj〉|
2 = 14 for i 6= j, that is, in the Bloch representa-
tion, they are separated by 120◦ on an equatorial plane of
the Bloch sphere. To see that the effective measurement
on the system is the POVM { 12I,
1
2I}, it suffices to note
that
Tra (Πsaρa) =
1
3Πs,1 +
1
3Πs,2 +
1
3Πs,3 =
1
2I.
The second Naimark extension is as follows. We im-
plement a preparation of the ancilla corresponding to the
mixed state
σa =
1
2 |1〉 〈1|+
1
2 |2〉 〈2| , (B2)
and implement a measurement on the composite of
system+ancilla corresponding to the three-outcome
projector-valued measure
{I ⊗ |1〉 〈1| , I ⊗ |2〉 〈2| , I ⊗ |3〉 〈3|} (B3)
≡ {Πsa,1,Πsa,2,Πsa,3} (B4)
(although technically this is a measurement on the com-
posite, it is obviously only nontrivial on the ancilla).
Again, it is straightforward to verify that the effective
measurement on the system is the POVM { 12I,
1
2I}.
The pair of projector-valued measures appearing
in the two Naimark extensions, {Πsa, I −Πsa} and
{Πsa,1,Πsa,2,Πsa,3}, are clearly distinct. This implies
that there are quantum states on sa that yield different
statistics for the two. For instance, the state 12I ⊗ |3〉 〈3|
yields 50/50 statistics for {Πsa, I −Πsa} but always
yields the third outcome for {Πsa,1,Πsa,2,Πsa,3}. This
implies that although these projector-valued measures
are each represented by a set of outcome-deterministic
response functions in an ontological model that is non-
contextual in the sense of definition 1 (by virtue of the-
orem 3), nonetheless the two sets of response functions
must be different to account for the differing statistics.
Appendix C: An explicit example of ontological
extension
We have seen in appendix B that because a quan-
tum measurement can be Naimark-extended in many
ways, and because those extensions may be statisti-
cally distinguishable, it follows that the sets of re-
sponse functions that represent these Naimark exten-
sions must also be inequivalent. This section provides
a second way of understanding the fact that the cost
of modelling statistically-indistinguishable measurements
outcome-deterministically is that on the extended sys-
tem, their representations are no longer equivalent. We
consider the trick described in appendix A for replac-
ing a response function on the system with an outcome-
deterministic response function on an extension of the
system. Specifically, we show by example that a pair of
measurements that are represented by the same set of
response functions on the system may need to be repre-
sented by different sets of response functions on its ex-
tension.
Let M be a measurement associated with the fair coin
flip POVM { 12I,
1
2I} that was discussed in Sec. VI. Let
the second measurement M ′ be defined as follows.
The procedure M ′: implement M , and upon
obtaining outcome b ∈ {0, 1} , output b ⊕ 1,
that is, the bit-flip of b.
Equivalently, we can say simply that M ′ is a measure-
ment of M with the outcomes permuted. Clearly M ′ is
also represented by the fair coin flip POVM. Now con-
sider how to representM andM ′ within a noncontextual
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ontological model. As argued in Sec. VI, the set of re-
sponse functions must be simply { 12 ,
1
2}.
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By the construction in appendix A, we can model both
M and M ′ on a larger system, a composite of system
s and an ancilla a with ontic state space Λs × Λa, in
such a way that the response functions are outcome-
deterministic. Specifically, if we apply this construction
to M , we obtain
ξ (0|λs, λa,M) ≡
{
1 if 0 ≤ λa ≤ 1/2
0 otherwise
, (C6)
ξ (1|λs, λa,M) ≡
{
1 if 1/2 ≤ λa ≤ 1
0 otherwise
. (C7)
Meanwhile, if we remember the definition of M ′, it is
clear that it must be represented by a set of response
functions that is simply the permutation of those for M ,
ξ (0|λs, λa,M
′) = ξ (1|λs, λa,M) , (C8)
ξ (1|λs, λa,M
′) = ξ (0|λs, λa,M) . (C9)
Now we see that although we’ve managed to have both
M and M ′ represented by sets of response functions on
Λs × Λa that are outcome-deterministic, the response
functions are not equivalent,
ξ (0|λs, λa,M
′) 6= ξ (0|λs, λa,M) , (C10)
ξ (1|λs, λa,M
′) 6= ξ (1|λs, λa,M) . (C11)
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